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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 960234-CA 
v. : 
VAO BOYD HUNSAKER, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from acceptance of a plea in abeyance to 
the charge of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1996). 
This Court is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
pursuant to Point I, infra. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court's written order accepting 
defendant's plea in abeyance and setting forth the 
conditions with which defendant must comply over the 
duration of the abeyance period constitutes a final written 
order from which defendant may take a direct appeal. 
This issue presents a question of law which this Court 
reviews de novo. See generalXy State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 
935-36 (Utah 1994). 
2. Assuming this Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal, did the conditions adopted by the trial court exceed 
the scope of conditions permitted under the plea in abeyance 
statutes? 
As this Court is without jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal, no standard of review applies to this issue. 
Alternatively, issues of statutory interpretation present 
questions of law which are reviewed on appeal for 
correctness. State v. Thurman. 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 
1996); State v. Gibson. 908 P.2d 352, 355 (Utah App. 1995), 
cert, denied. 917 P.2d 556 (Utah 1996). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
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presented on appeal is contained in or appended to this 
brief. 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
On December 12, 1995, defendant was charged with 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1996) (R. 1-2). Defendant 
waived his preliminary hearing, and was bound over to 
district court for trial (R. 10). On January 29, 1996, a 
change of plea hearing was held in which defendant withdrew 
his plea of not guilty, entered a plea of guilty to be held 
in abeyance pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-l, g£ seq. (a 
copy of the statutes is attached as addendum A), and 
executed a plea in abeyance agreement (R. 21, 25-27; 
Transcript of Change of Plea Hearing [hereinafter "Plea 
Tr."] 2-3, 9) (a copy of the written agreement is attached 
as addendum B). The district court referred defendant to 
Adult Probation and Parole for a recommendation as to 
additional conditions to be imposed pursuant to the terms of 
the written agreement (R. 22, 26-27; Plea Tr. 9-10)• 
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On February 26, 1996, a disposition hearing was held at 
which both counsel and defendant addressed the court (R. 23-
24; 3 8-45) (a copy of the hearing transcript is attached as 
addendum C). The trial court then imposed additional 
conditions to accompany the conditions contained in 
defendant's plea in abeyance agreement (R. 28, 45-47). Those 
conditions included a "fine and surcharge" of $ 925.00, 
together with "1 year in the Box Elder County Jail with 
release to an inpatient program as soon as it can be 
arranged" and a provision that the remainder of the jail 
sentence be "suspended upon [defendant] successfully 
completing the inpatient program" (R. 30, 45A) .x Addendum 
C. The Court then directed defendant, his counsel, and his 
probation officer "to get busy and start to find out where 
you can get into a program . . . ." (R. 47). Apparently 
between May 6 and May 20, 1996, defendant was released to 
the Salvation Army Program (R. 52, 57). 
xThe transcript of the February 26 disposition hearing 
is paginated as part of the record with the exception of 
page 45A. That page is internally paginated as page 11 and 
falls between record pages 45 and 46. The State cites it as 
"R. 45A" throughout this brief. 
4 
Defendant appeals from the trial court's written order 
dated February 29, 1996, memorializing the acceptance of the 
plea in abeyance and the imposition of conditions. 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
On December 6, 1995, defendant entered the home of 
Patsy Fridal and demanded that she give him the knives he 
had purportedly left there earlier (R. 4; Plea Tr. 6). When 
Ms, Fridal gave defendant a single knife, defendant insisted 
that there should be more (Plea Tr. 6). Defendant then 
opened the blade of the knife he held, pointed it in 
Fridal's direction and waived it while he made some 
threatening comments to Fridal (R. 4; Plea Tr. 6-7). He was 
apprehended shortly thereafter, showing numerous signs of 
intoxication (R. 4; Plea Tr. 6-7). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I: This Court has no jurisdiction to entertain 
this appeal because the order from which defendant appeals 
is not a final order, as required by the rules of appellate 
procedure. The challenged order reflects the trial court's 
acceptance of defendant's plea in abeyance and imposes 
5 
certain specific conditions on defendant. The order did not 
end the proceedings, and it left open questions for further 
action by the court, which action is inevitable under Utah 
law. 
Defendant failed to comply with this Court's 
requirements for perfecting an interlocutory appeal. 
Because rule 2, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, prohibits 
this Court from suspending those requirements, this Court 
should reject defendant's request that his direct appeal be 
considered to be an interlocutory appeal should this Court 
find that the order is not a final appealable order. 
Point II: This Court should not reach defendant's 
objection to the trial court's imposition of a fine because 
he raises the issue for the first time on appeal. 
Defendant's objection to the trial court's imposition of 
jail time as a condition of his plea in abeyance is without 
merit because the trial court's actions are expressly 
permitted by the plain language of the relevant statutes. 
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ARGUMENTS 
THIS COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN 
DEFENDANT'S APPEAL BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER 
IS NOT A FINAL ORDER; FURTHER, DEFENDANT HAS NOT 
COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR FILING AN 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL, AND THOSE REQUIREMENTS 
CANNOT BE SUSPENDED 
ha. The Challenged Order Is Not A Final Order From Which A 
Direct Appeal Lies 
Defendant claims that the trial court's written order, 
memorializing the court's acceptance of the plea in abeyance 
and imposing numerous conditions with which defendant agreed 
to comply under the plea agreement, constitutes a final 
order from which he may take a direct appeal. Appellant's 
Br. at 7-12 (a copy of the order is attached as addendum D). 
He claims that the challenged order is final because it 
terminated the "particular proceeding" before the court and 
"specified with certainty a final determination of the 
rights of the parties." Id. at 9-11. However, this 
argument misinterprets Utah case law and ignores the plain 
language of the relevant statutes. 
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A direct appeal lies from "all final orders and 
judgments." Utah R. App. P. 3(a). A final, appealable 
order must completely determine the rights of the parties 
and end the proceedings, "leaving no question open for 
further judicial action." State in Interest of T.P,C, 748 
P.2d 201, 202 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 
1988); £££ fliSQ Kessimakis Vt Kessimakis/ 546 P.2d 888, 889 
(Utah 1976) (holding that a divorce decree which did not 
become final until three months after its entry was a final 
appealable order where there were "no other proceedings to 
be had in order for it to become final"). The challenged 
order neither ends the proceedings nor leaves no questions 
open for additional action by the court where subsequent 
proceedings related to the plea in abeyance are inevitable. 
Defendant's arguments do not change the fact that he 
voluntarily entered a plea in abeyance below. It is clear 
from the plain language of the statutes that "[a]cceptance 
of a plea in abeyance and the entry of judgment of 
conviction and the imposition of sentence are not 
simultaneous events." State v. Moss. 921 P.2d 1021, 1025 
8 
n.7 (Utah App. 1996); Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-2a-l(l), 
-2(1) (1995), and 77-2a-3(l) (Supp. 1996). The plain 
language of the statute clearly contemplates court 
involvement after acceptance of a plea in abeyance, 
regardless of whether the defendant is successful or 
unsuccessful in complying with the conditions of the plea. 
The trial court eventually must act in one of two ways: 1) 
issue an order to show cause, conduct an evidentiary 
hearing, enter a finding, if appropriate, that defendant has 
"failed to substantially comply with any term or condition 
of the plea in abeyance agreement," then terminate the 
agreement, and enter judgment of conviction and impose 
sentence against defendant (Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-4(l)); or 
2) enter a finding that defendant has successfully completed 
the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement, permit 
defendant to withdraw his plea, and, in this case, dismiss 
the charge against defendant. Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-3(2) 
and (3). Addendum A. Consequently, the trial court's 
acceptance of a plea in abeyance "is not a final 
adjudication." Moss. 921 P.2d at 1025 n.7. 
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Here, the trial court and both parties recognized this 
fact. Defendant executed a plea in abeyance agreement 
stating that he understood that after acceptance of his 
plea, there would be further proceedings before the court, 
either to determine whether he "failed to substantially 
comply with any term or condition of the Judgment and Order" 
and to then "terminate the agreement and enter judgment of 
conviction and impose sentence", or to determine "that the 
defendant has successfully completed the terms and 
conditions of th[e] Plea in Abeyance Agreement" and to 
"dismiss the charge of Aggravated Assault" (R. 26) . 
Addendum B. 
The trial court also recognized that it was neither 
sentencing defendant nor entering a final adjudication of 
the matter. The judge stated at the February 26, 1996, 
hearing that he was merely imposing "additional conditions 
for the plea in abeyance" (R. 45; Addendum C) , and the 
written order explicitly recognized that proceedings 
involving the plea were to be on-going, providing: 
10 
The court retains jurisdiction to make such other 
and further Orders as it may deem necessary from time 
to time, and, further, retains jurisdiction to 
terminate the terms and conditions hereof and enter 
defendant's plea of guilty. The Court further retains 
jurisdiction to sentence the defendant, either at such 
time as this Order is terminated, or at such time as 
the defendant successfully completes the terms and 
conditions hereof. 
(R. 29-32). Addendum D. 
This record demonstrates that all involved knew that 
the proceedings did not end with the imposition of 
conditions, that further judicial action was inevitable, and 
that the rights of the parties would not be fully defined or 
settled until such time as the plea was withdrawn and the 
charges dismissed, or judgment and sentence were entered. 
Defendant argues that the order was final because it 
ended the proceedings in which conditions were imposed upon 
defendant.2 Appellant's Br. at 9-10. However, defendant 
2Defendant asserts that entry of judgment and 
imposition of sentence would occur in separate proceedings 
based on his guilty plea inasmuch as the plea in abeyance 
agreement would first be terminated. Appellant's Br. at 9-
10. His argument is without merit, however, as the language 
of defendant's written agreement, as well as that of section 
77-2a-4(l), contemplates that judicial action occur before 
the agreement can be terminated. 
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ignores the trial court's explanation at the February 
hearing that his usual practice when faced with defendants 
who have violated the terms of their pleas in abeyance is to 
"restart[] probation or add[] additional terms" (R. 41). 
Addendum C. Consequently, additional proceedings to set 
additional conditions were still possible, rendering 
defendant's argument unpersuasive. 
No matter what happened once the court accepted 
defendant's plea, further court action was mandated by law 
in order to complete the proceedings and finally dispose of 
the charges against defendant based upon his own compliance 
(or lack thereof) with the plea agreement. The challenged 
order neither terminated the proceedings before the court 
nor provided a final determination of the rights of the 
parties. Accordingly, the written order memorializing the 
trial court's acceptance of the plea in abeyance and 
imposing additional conditions upon defendant is not final 
for purposes of appeal. 
Moreover, in a criminal case, Mi]t is the sentence 
itself which constitutes a final judgment from which 
12 
appellant has the right to appeal." State v. Gerrard, 584 
P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1978). In this case, defendant was not 
sentenced and may never be sentenced. Consequently, the 
challenged order is a pre-sentence order from which an 
appeal does not lie. See id. at 886 (all "incidents, 
impressions, or statements made by the court" prior to 
sentencing "are not the judgment of the case and, therefore, 
are not appealable"). 
This does not mean that defendant was without a 
recourse when the trial court imposed conditions with which 
he did not agree. Upon imposition of the challenged 
conditions, either orally at the February 26 hearing or in 
writing on February 27, defendant was free to seek 
withdrawal of his plea in abeyance because the thirty-day 
withdrawal period had not expired. He made no effort, 
however, to do so. 
EL. Defendant's Lack Of Compliance With Rule 5(a). Utah 
Rules Of Appellate Procedure, Prevents Conversion Of 
His Direct Appeal To An Interlocutory Appeal 
Should this Court find that it lacks jurisdiction over 
the direct appeal, defendant requests that it treat the 
13 
direct appeal as an interlocutory appeal. Appellant's Br. 
at 12-13. Defendant provides no authority for such novel 
treatment of a direct appeal and does not explain how the 
interests of justice, as opposed to defendant's own 
interests, will be served by such unusual treatment. Id. 
Defendant overlooks the basic fact that he has failed 
to cottrply with the requirements for perfecting an 
interlocutory appeal. The challenged order was not 
certified as final by the lower court pursuant to rule 
54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Consequently, 
defendant would have to comply with the filing requirements 
of rule 5(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, in order to 
obtain interlocutory review of the order. Instead of filing 
with this Court a petition for permission to appeal from an 
interlocutory order within twenty days after entry of the 
trial court's order on February 27, 1996, defendant filed a 
notice of appeal in the district court on March 21, which 
notice was received by this Court on April 2--thirty-five 
days after entry of the order. Defendant's brief--which 
would more closely resemble the required petition than the 
14 
notice of appeal--was filed in October, nearly eight months 
after entry of the challenged order. 
Accordingly, in order to grant his request, this Court 
would have to invoke its power to suspend the provisions of 
the appellate rules pursuant to rule 2, Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure. However, rule 2 expressly provides 
that this Court cannot suspend the provisions of rule 5(a). 
As defendant cannot be excused from the requirements of 
filing an interlocutory petition and offers no other basis 
upon which this Court could consider his direct appeal to be 
an interlocutory appeal, his request must fail. 
POINT II 
THE APPLICABLE STATUTES PERMIT SETTING JAIL TIME 
AND A FINE AS CONDITIONS OF A PLEA IN ABEYANCE 
Should this Court determine that the order is a final 
order from which a direct appeal lies, it should reject 
defendant's claim that the trial court erred when it imposed 
certain conditions on defendant after accepting his plea in 
abeyance. 
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A^ . Waiver; Imposition Of Fine 
Defendant challenges the trial court's imposition of a 
"fine" of $925.00, claiming that section 77-2a-3 (5) (a) 
prohibits imposition of a fine and demonstrates the 
legislature's intent that wa fine constitutes a 'sentence.'" 
Appellant's Br. at 14-15. However, this Court need not 
reach defendant's argument because he not only failed to 
raise the issue below, but he made a conscious decision not 
to do so, as demonstrated by the following exchange which 
occurred at the February 26 hearing after a prolonged 
discussion about the incarceration issue: 
THE COURT: . . . I'll require that he pay a fine 
and surcharge in the amount of $925. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Excuse me. Would that be more 
appropriately termed an administrative fee? Let me --
well, that's fine. 
THE COURT: I'm not sure where you're going with 
that. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I'll withdraw that. 
(R. 45A) . Addendum C. Although the trial court invited 
defendant to clarify his concern about imposition of the 
fee, counsel declined to do so and made no effort thereafter 
to challenge imposition of the fine. Consequently, this 
16 
Court should not reach the issue. See State v. Moreno. 910 
P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah App.) (refusing to consider an issue 
raised for the first time on appeal where defendant fails to 
argue plain error or exceptional circumstances), cert. 
denied. 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996); State V, Gordon, 886 P.2d 
112, 117 (Utah App. 1994) (a defendant is not entitled to 
relief on appeal for an invited error); State v. Stevenson, 
884 P.2d 1287, 1293 (Utah App. 1994) (no relief warranted 
for an invited error), cert, denied. 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 
1995). 
Moreover, even on the merits, defendant's claim fails, 
as shown below. 
B^ _ Merits: Fine anfl jail Cpnflitipns 
Defendant argues that the trial court essentially 
sentenced him when it imposed, as conditions of the plea in 
abeyance, that he pay a fine and that he be incarcerated *in 
the Salt Lake County Jail until his counsel and probation 
officer could arrange his acceptance to a qualified 
treatment program. Appellant's Br. at 13-19. He claims that 
the "sentencing" violated Chapter 2a of Title 77, which 
17 
allows for sentencing only after violation of any of the 
conditions relating to a plea in abeyance. Id. However, 
this claim fails for the simple reason that the plain 
language of the laws of this State permit the court to 
impose such conditions when a plea in abeyance is accepted. 
Defendant's argument presents a question of statutory 
interpretation, which this Court reviews for correctness. 
State v. Thurman. 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996). The Court 
looks first to the plain language of the statute, resorting 
to other methods of statutory interpretation only if an 
ambiguity is found in the plain language. Id. at 373. This 
Court need look no further than the plain language of the 
statute to decide this issue. 
The trial court accepted defendant's plea of guilty to 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, but held that 
plea in abeyance, pursuant to the agreement between the 
State and defendant, on certain specified conditions (R. 25-
32). Addenda B and D. After hearing arguments on whether 
the imposition of jail time constituted a sentence or a 
permissible condition of the plea in abeyance statutes, the 
18 
trial court adopted the plain language of the abeyance 
statutes and imposed several "additional conditions for the 
plea in abeyance'' (R. 45) , including: l)that the defendant 
would "serve 1 year in the Box Elder County Jail with 
release to an inpatient program as soon as it can be 
arranged" and the remainder of the jail sentence be 
"suspended upon successfully completing the inpatient 
program" (R. 3 0); and 2) that the defendant "shall pay a 
fine and surcharge in the amount of $925.00." (R. 30). 
Addendum D. 
The imposition of these conditions is specifically 
authorized by the plain language of that chapter, which the 
trial court correctly implemented. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-3(5) (Supp. 1996), provides: 
(5) The court may upon acceptance of a plea in 
abeyance agreement and pursuant to the terms of the 
agreement: 
(a) order the defendant to pay a nonrefundable 
plea in abeyance fee, which shall be allocated in 
the same manner as if it had been paid as a fine 
and shall not exceed in amount the maximum fine 
which could have been imposed upon conviction and 
sentencing for the same offense; 
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(b) order the defendant to pay all or a 
portion of the costs of administration of the 
agreement; 
(c) order the defendant to pay restitution to 
the victims of his actions as provided in Section 
76-3-201; 
(d) order the defendant to pay the costs of 
any rehabilitative program required by the terms 
of the agreement; and 
(e) ordey the defendant to comply with any 
other conditions which could have been imposed as 
conditions of probation upon conviction and 
sentencing for the same offense, 
(Emphasis added). Addendum A. The conditions incorporated 
by reference into section 77-2a-3(5)(e) are set forth in 
Utah Code Ann, § 77-18-1(8) (Supp. 1996): 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of 
probation, the defendant may be required to perform any 
or all of the following: 
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine 
imposed at the time of being placed on probation: 
(b) pay amounts required under Title 77, 
Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(c) provide for the support of others for 
whose support he is legally liable; 
(d) participate in available treatment 
programs; 
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail 
not to exceed one year: 
(f) serve a term of home confinement, which 
may include the use of electronic monitoring; 
(g) participate in community service 
restitution programs, including the community 
service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7; 
20 
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, 
probation, and treatment services; 
(i) make restitution or reparation to the 
victim or victims with interest in accordance with 
Subsection 76-3-201(4); and 
(j) comply with other terms and conditions the 
court considers appropriate. 
(Emphasis added). 
In sum, a trial court may order a defendant whose plea 
is held in abeyance to comply with any condition which could 
have been imposed as a condition of probation; a defendant 
may be required to serve up to one year in jail as a 
condition of probation; therefore, the court may order a 
defendant whose plea is held in abeyance to serve up to one 
year in jail as a condition of the plea in abeyance. The 
same is true for the $925.00 fine of which defendant 
complains. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-3(5)(a) (permitting 
the court to impose upon defendant a nonrefundable fee up to 
the amount of the maximum fine which could otherwise have 
been imposed upon conviction of the offense to which he pled 
guilty) and § 76-3-301 (Supp. 1995) (fine of $5,000 may be 
imposed upon conviction of third degree felony). Whether 
labeled "fine" or "fee," the plea in abeyance statutes 
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contemplate that defendant may be made to pay the full 
amount levied in this case and that the amount may be levied 
as a condition of the plea. Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-2a-3(5) (e) 
and -4(1). Addendum A. 
Defendant does not contest the fact that imprisonment 
in jail is one of the conditions which can be imposed on a 
probationer. Instead, he claims that the "plain" meaning of 
this part of the statute changes when it is read "in the 
context of the plea in abeyance statute as a whole." 
Appellant's Br. at 14. He argues that the imposition of 
jail time constitutes a "sentence" under a literal 
definition of that term, and that to interpret section 77-
2a-3(5) (e) as permitting imposition of such a "sentence" 
would render "meaningless" the legislature's direction that 
no sentence will be imposed when the plea is accepted by the 
court. Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-l(l). Appellant's Br. at 13-
16.3 
3Defendant also claims that it deprives him of one of 
the intended benefits of such a plea--the fact that he is 
able to avoid serving a sentence. Appellant's Br. at 17-19. 
Defendant baldly claims that the legislature "clearly" 
intended that a plea in abeyance convey two benefits upon 
22 
Giving the language of section 77-2a-3(5)(e) its plain 
meaning does not nullify the statute's direction that no 
sentence be imposed upon the acceptance of a plea in 
abeyance. Defendant pled guilty to a third degree felony, 
which carries an indeterminate sentence of up to five years 
in the Utah State Prison, together with the possibility of 
an enhancement of a consecutive indeterminate tenn of up to 
five years for the use of a dangerous weapon. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203(3) (Supp. 1996). While the trial court 
imposed jail time pursuant to the plain language of sections 
77-2a-3(5) (e) and 77-18-1(8), it could not, and did not, 
impose the above prison sentence upon defendant, in full 
compliance with the provisions of section 77-2a-l. Should 
defendant ultimately violate any of the conditions of the 
defendants: 1) no conviction; and 2) no sentence, i.e., no 
incarceration. Id. at 17-18. Not only is his position that 
"no sentence" includes no jail time erroneous, as argued in 
Point II, but the legislative history does not support his 
claim. Senator Hillyard's explanation notes that both 
defendant and the prosecutor benefit from a plea in 
abeyance: if defendant complies with the conditions, then 
the plea is dismissed; if he does not, then he proceeds to 
sentencing without the time and effort of a trial. Senate 
Hearing and Vote on S.B. 183, 50th Legislature, Day 39, Tape 
50 (Feb. 18, 1993). 
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plea, the trial court would then be free to impose the 
prison sentence, as contemplated by the statutes. 
This interpretation reflects the legislature's 
determination that the trial court must have latitude, short 
of imposing the lawful prison sentence which could be 
imposed upon conviction of the offense, to determine the 
appropriate conditions in any given case upon receipt of all 
the information necessary to make a decision as to the 
conditions of the plea. In this case, it was the receipt of 
information from, and a recommendation by, AP&P that 
resulted in the challenged condition.4 The trial court's 
imposition on defendant of conditions which could have been 
imposed as conditions of probation fully complies with the 
plain language of the statute while leaving in tact the 
statutory requirement that both entry of a judgment of 
conviction and imposition of sentence must await a violation 
of the plea conditions. 
4The information from AP&P is not part of the appellate 
record and is not challenged on appeal. 
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Moreover, once defendant learned of the specific 
conditions, he was still able to seek withdrawal of his plea 
because the thirty-day withdrawal period had not expired. 
However, he made no effort to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully 
requests that this Court dismiss defendant's appeal for lack 
of jurisdiction or, alternatively, affirm the trial court's 
imposition of conditions pursuant to Chapter 2a of Title 77. 




KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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PLEAS IN ABEYANCE 77-2a-2 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v. Ramsey, 782 P.2d 480 (Utah 
1989). 
CHAPTER 2a 
PLEAS IN ABEYANCE 
Section Section 
77-2a-l. Definitions. 77-2a-4. Violation of plea in abeyance 
77~2a-2. Plea in abeyance agreement — agreement — Hearing — Entry 
Negotiation — Contents — of judgment and imposition of 
Terms of agreement — Waiver sentence — Subsequent pros-
of time for sentencing. ecutions. 
77-2a<3. Manner of entry of plea — Powers 
of court. 
77-2a-l. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this chapter: 
(1) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the 
prosecution and the defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest 
from the defendant but not, at that time, entering judgment of conviction 
against him nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that he comply 
with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into 
between the prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms 
and conditions upon which, following acceptance of the agreement by the 
court, a plea may be held in abeyance. 
History: C. 1958, 77-JU-l, enacted by L. came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to 
1993, eh. S3,1 3. Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 26. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 82 be-
77-2a-2, Plea in abeyance agreement — Negotiation — 
Contents — Terms of agreement — Waiver of 
time for sentencing. 
(1) At any time after acceptance of a plea of guilty or no contest but prior to 
entry of judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence, the court may, upon 
motion of both the prosecuting attorney and the defendant, hold the plea in 
abeyance and not enter judgment of conviction against the defendant nor 
impose sentence upon the defendant within the time periods contained in Rule 
22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
(2) The defendant shall be represented by counsel during negotiations for a 
plea in abeyance and at the time of acknowledgment and affirmation of any 
plea in abeyance agreement unless the defendant shall have knowingly and 
intelligently waived his right to counsel. 
(3) The defendant has the right to be represented by counsel at any court 
hearing relating to a plea in abeyance agreement. 
(4) (a) Any plea in abeyance agreement entered into between the prosecu-
tion and the defendant and approved by the court shall include a foil, 
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detailed recitation of the requirements and conditions agreed to by the 
defendant and the reason for requesting the court to hold the plea in 
abeyance. 
(b) If the plea is to a felony or any combination of misdemeanors and 
felonies, the agreement shall be in writing and shall, prior to acceptance 
by the court, be executed by the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, and 
the defendant's counsel in the presence of the court. 
(5) A plea shall not be held in abeyance for a period longer than 18 months 
if the plea was to any class of misdemeanor or longer than three years if the 
plea was to any degree of felony or to any combination of misdemeanors and 
felonies. 
(6) A plea in abeyance agreement shall not be approved unless the defen-
dant, before the court, and any written agreement, knowingly and intelligently 
waives time for sentencing as designated in Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
History: C. 1953, T7-2a-2, enacted by L. came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to 
1993, ch. 82, ft 4. Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 26. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 82 be-
77-2a-3. Manner of entry of plea — Powers of court 
(1) Acceptance of any plea in anticipation of a plea in abeyance agreement 
shall be done in full compliance with the provisions of Rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
(2) A plea in abeyance agreement may provide that the court may, upon 
finding that the defendant has successfully completed the terms of the 
agreement: 
(a) reduce the degree of the offense and enter judgment of conviction 
and impose sentence for a lower degree of offense; or 
(b) allow withdrawal of defendant's plea and order the dismissal of the 
case. 
(3) Upon finding that a defendant has successfully completed the terms of a 
plea in abeyance agreement, the court shall reduce the degree of the offense, 
dismiss the case only as provided in the plea in abeyance agreement or as 
agreed to by all parties. Upon sentencing a defendant for any lesser offense 
pursuant to a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may not invoke Section 
76-3-402 to further reduce the degree of the offense. 
(4) The court may require the Department of Corrections to assist in the 
administration of the plea in abeyance agreement as if the defendant were on 
probation to the court under Section 77-18-1. 
(5) The court may upon acceptance of a plea in abeyance agreement and 
pursuant to the terms of the agreement: 
(a) order the defendant to pay a nonrefundable plea in abeyance fee, 
which shall be allocated in the same manner as if it had been paid as a fine 
and shall not exceed in amount the maximum fine which could have been 
imposed upon conviction and sentencing for the same offense; 
(b) order the defendant to pay all or a portion of the costs of adminis-
tration of the agreement; 
(c) order the defendant to pay full restitution to the victims of his 
actions as provided in Section 76-3-201; 
(d) order the defendant to pay the costs of any rehabilitative program 
required by the terms of the agreement; and 
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(e) order the defendant to comply with any other conditions which could 
have been imposed as conditions of probation upon conviction and sen-
tencing for the same offense. 
(6) A court may not hold a plea in abeyance without the consent of both the 
prosecuting attorney and the defendant. A decision by a prosecuting attorney 
not to agree to a plea in abeyance is not subject to judicial review. 
(7) No plea may be held in abeyance in any case involving a sexual offense 
against a victim who is under the age of 14. 
History: C. 1958, 77-2a-3, enacted by L. came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to 
1993, ch. 82, ft 5. Utah Const., Art VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 82 be-
77-2a-4. Violation of plea in abeyance agreement — Hear-
ing — Entry of judgment and imposition of sen-
tence — Subsequent prosecutions. 
(1) If, at any time during the term of the plea in abeyance agreement, 
information comes to the attention of the prosecuting attorney or the court that 
the defendant has violated any condition of the agreement, the court, at the 
request of the prosecuting attorney, made by appropriate motion and affidavit, 
or upon its own motion, may issue an order requiring the defendant to appear 
before the court at a designated time and place to show cause why the court 
should not find the terms of the agreement to have been violated and why the 
agreement should not be terminated. If, following an evidentiary hearing, the 
court finds that the defendant has failed to substantially comply with any term 
or condition of the plea in abeyance agreement, it may terminate the agree-
ment and enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence against the 
defendant for the offense to which the original plea was entered. Upon entry of 
judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence, any amounts paid by the 
defendant as a plea in abeyance fee prior to termination of the agreement shall 
be credited against any fine imposed by the court. 
(2) The termination of a plea in abeyance agreement and subsequent entry 
of judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence shall not bar any 
independent prosecution arising from any offense that constituted a violation 
of any term or condition of an agreement whereby the original plea was placed 
in abeyance. 
History: C. 1953, 77-2a-4, enacted by L. came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to 
1W3, ch. 82, ft 6. Utah Const, Art. VI. Sec. 25. 
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121 FLEAS IN ABEYANCE 77-2a-3 
77-2a-3. Manner of entry of plea — Powers of court. 
(1) Acceptance of any plea in anticipation of a plea in abeyance agreement 
shall be done in full compliance with the provisions of Rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
(2) A plea in abeyance agreement may provide that the court may, upon 
finding that the defendant has successfully completed the terms of the 
agreement: 
(a) reduce the degree of the offense and enter judgment of conviction 
and impose sentence for a lower degree of offense; or 
(b) allow withdrawal of defendant's plea and order the dismissal of the 
case. 
(3) Upon finding that a defendant has successfully completed the terms of a 
plea in abeyance agreement, the court shall reduce the degree of the offense, 
dismiss the case only as provided in the plea in abeyance agreement or as 
agreed to by all parties. Upon sentencing a defendant for any lesser offense 
pursuant to a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may not invoke Section 
76-3-402 to further reduce the degree of the offense. 
(4) The court may require the Department of Corrections to assist in the 
administration of the plea in abeyance agreement as if the defendant were on 
probation to the court under Section 77-18-1. 
(5) The court may upon acceptance of a plea in abeyance agreement and 
pursuant to the terms of the agreement: 
(a) order the defendant to pay a nonrefundable plea in abeyance fee, 
which shall be allocated in the same manner as if it had been paid as a fine 
and shall not exceed in amount the maximum fine which could have been 
imposed upon conviction and sentencing for the same offense; 
(b) order the defendant to pay all or a portion of the costs of adminis-
tration of the agreement; 
(c) order the defendant to pay restitution to the victims of his actions as 
provided in Section 76-3-201; 
(d) order the defendant to pay the costs of any rehabilitative program 
required by the terms of the agreement; and 
(e) order the defendant to comply with any other conditions which could 
have been imposed as conditions of probation upon conviction and sen-
tencing for the same'offense. 
(6) A court may not hold a plea in abeyance without the consent of both the 
prosecuting attorney and the defendant. A decision by a prosecuting attorney 
not to agree to a plea in abeyance is not subject to judicial review. 
(7) No plea may be held in abeyance in any case involving a sexual offense 
against a victim who is under the age of 14. 
History: C. 1953, 77-2a-3, enacted by I* meat, effective May 1, 1995, deleted full" be-
1993, chu 82, f 6; 1995, ch. 301, ft 2. fore "restitution" in Subsection (6Xc). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 1 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
VAO BOYD HUNSAKER, J 
Defendant. : 
! MOTION, AGREEMENT, AND 
: ORDER FOR PLEA IN 
! ABEYANCE 
! Case No. q S l & S P W ) 
Come now the parties hereto, the State of Utah through its 
undersigned representative, and the defendant both personally and 
through his undersigned attorney, and jointly request the Court 
to accept a Plea in Abeyance in this matter, pursuant to the 
terms and conditions specified herein, and, further, agree to the 
terms and conditions specified herein regarding a Plea in 
Abeyance: 
1. The defendant shall enter a plea of guilty to the 
following charge or charges: 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A FELONY OF THE 3RD DEGREE, ON OR ABOUT 
DECEMBER 6, 1995. 
2. The Court shall accept the defendants plea of guilty, 
but not enter judgment of conviction nor impose sentence, and all 
time periods otherwise imposed by applicable law regarding the 
time for entry of judgment or conviction against the defendant, 
and the time to impose sentence upon the defendant are hereby 
specifically waived. 
•ICSOPTTMEO 
3. The defendant is represented by the undersigned attorney 
and has been during negotiations for the Plea in Abeyance. 
4. The plea entered shall be held in abeyance for a period 
of 36 months. 
5. The defendant specifically understands and agrees that 
if, at any time prior to the expiration of the term during which 
the plea is to be held in abeyance, the Court finds that the 
defendant has failed to substantially comply with any term or 
condition of the Judgment and Order entered in this matter, the 
Court may then terminate the agreement and enter judgment of 
conviction and impose sentence against the defendant for the 
offense to which the original plea was entered. 
6. Upon the Court finding that the defendant has 
successfully completed the terms and conditions of this Plea in 
Abeyance Agreement, the Court shall dismiss the charge of 
Aggravated Assault. 
7. The defendant shall be supervised by the Utah State 
Department of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole Department, 
as if the defendant were on Probation. 
8. The special terms and conditions of this Plea in 
Abeyance Agreement, which shall be administered and supervised as 
if the defendant were on Probation, are to be as later imposed by 
the court following recommendations being received by the court 
from the Department of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole. 
9. The parties understand and agree that the Court retains 
2 
OOO(J2;> 
jurisdiction to make such other and further orders, conditions, 
and terms as it deems necessary. 
DATED this 29th day of January, 1996. 
BARON 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
~-"KlCHAEL D. BOUWHU 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
APPROVAL AND ORDER 
The Court, after reading and considering the above Motion 
and Agreement for Plea in Abeyance, and having fully considered 
the same, and good cause appearing therefore, hereby approves the 
above Agreement/ grants the Motion of the parties to accept the 
Plea in Abeyance, and will enter its Order accordingly. 
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• P a g e 1 
THE CLERK: Case number 951000140, State of Utah 
vs. Vao Boyd Hunsaker. 
THE COURT: The record should reflect that the 
defendant is present along with his counsel. The 
court has received and reviewed a presentence 
investigation report. The defendant is before the 
court for sentencing pursuant to his guilty plea to 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony. 
Mr. Bouwhuis, have you had an opportunity 
to review this report with your client? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Well, I've had the opportunity to 
review it and I dropped a copy off at the jail on 
Friday to Mr. Hunsaker. He indicates he doesn't have 
any questions on the report. 
THE COURT: Mr. Hunsaker, if you want more time 
I'll pass and go to another case and let you have an 
opportunity to visit with Mr. Bouwhuis. If you want 
to go ahead and proceed, we'll proceed now. 
MR. HUNSAKER: Let's go ahead. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BUNDERSON: Isn't this a plea in abeyance 
with conditions? That's what our file seems to 
indicate . 
MR. BOUWHUIS: It is. 
THE COURT: Just a moment. 
ooooo'; 
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(Pause in the proceedings.) 
MR. BUNDERSON: The report doesn't mention it, 
but in looking at the file the first thing I have in 
here is a motion, agreement and order for plea in 
abeyance. I assume that's what we're doing today. 
THE COURT: Based on the representations of 
counsel, this does appear to be a plea in abeyance 
agreement. I note for the record that the agreement 
apparently is in microfilming. It's not here in front 
of me . 
MR. BUNDERSON: For the court's benefit, it's 
just a standard agreement. The plea is to be held for 
a period of 36 months. The charge is to be dismissed 
at the end of 36 months. It was sent to AP&P for 
further conditions, if any. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Bouwhuis, I'll hear 
from you at this time. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Thank you, Your Honor. The court 
is well aware, since we've kind of gone the rounds on 
the plea in abeyance issue before, on our position. 
Mr. Caine addressed that in the sentencing that was 
held just previously. I ,don't want to belabor the 
point too much, but for the record would point out 
that pleas in abeyance are governed by section 
77-2a-l. 0000c 
» « A. A ^ 
On a previous case I pointed out to the 
court that I think it best, when this statute is 
viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, I 
think at best the statute is ambiguous. When viewed 
in light — well, from any perspective, it's 
ambiguous . 
Our position, Your Honor, is that the 
first subsection of 77-2a-l defines pleas in abeyance. 
It states that the court is to not enter a judgment of 
conviction nor impose sentence. Of course, the 
statute goes on to say in detail exactly what a plea 
in abeyance entails. 77-2a-3, sub five, does state 
what the court can do. 
I think what the State would rely upon in 
asking the court to follow the recommendations, 
specifically with reference to serving the jail time, 
i s subsection E. 
THE COURT: Can you give me that citation again? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: 77-2a-3, subsection five, sub E is 
what I'm going to refer to. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: I believe that would be the 
subsection that the State would rely on in urging the 
court to follow the recommendation for jail. The 
court may order the defendant to comply with any other 
OO ro->' , 
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conditions which could have been imposed as conditions 
of probation upon conviction and sentencing for the 
same offense. 
This, I think, is where the biggest 
ambiguity in the statute lies. That directly 
contradicts, or seems to conflict, with their 
definition of what a plea in abeyance is. That is, 
you don't enter a conviction or impose sentence. 
If we construe this subsection E as liberally 
as I think the State would have the court do, then the 
court could do what the State says here, impose any 
conditions upon imposition of sentencing. The reason 
that doesn't make sense to me is because if you can 
impose anything you can do upon a conviction and 
sentencing, then it is sentencing. We just call it 
something else. 
THE COURT: Except as a condition of probation. 
In other words, one of the things you can't do is send 
someone to prison* 
MR. BOUWHUIS: That's correct. However, if we 
read the statute carefully, the statute doesn't 
distinguish between misdemeanors and felonies. It 
does recognize, in 77-2a-2, subsections four and five, 
that there is a difference between misdemeanors and 
felonies, but it does not distinguish between them as 
0000*0 
1 to how a plea in abeyance would apply. I think this 
2 goes to part of the ambiguity. 
3 The legislature did a very poor job in 
4 drafting this piece of work here. I think one of the 
5 effects, and obviously we haven't gotten to this point 
6 yet, but I think, if we had a crystal ball and could 
7 see that Mr. Hunsaker, or anybody else, were to 
8 violate a condition that was imposed under a plea in 
9 abeyance, they would be brought before the court and 
10 the recommendation would then be prison. I think that 
11 goes against the spirit of the plea in abeyance. That 
12 is, that it be one step removed from that process. 
13 In other words, when there's a plea in 
14 abeyance and a violation of a condition arises, then 
15 the conviction would be entered and sentencing set and 
16 imposed at that point. If we're imposing sentence up 
17 front, it renders those terms of the statute 
18 completely meaningless. 
19 THE COURT: Let me ask you, though, because I've 
20 had this happen before as you just described. We 
21 enter the judgment of conviction. They violate the 
22 terms of the plea in abeyance agreement. On those 
23 occasions that I recall, we've not shifted to the 
24 prison, we've restarted probation or added additional 
25 terms. I know one that eventually made his way to 
OQQUa 
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prison, but it was not a result of a single event as 
you describe. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: I recognize that. Quite often, 
Your Honor, an individual who is on regular probation 
comes before the court for a violation and is not 
immediately sent to prison. What I'm saying is that 
the way this statute and the way the plea in abeyance 
appears to be interpreted/ the defendants are not 
removed at all. I think the intent is that they be 
removed one step from that. I don't think that would 
b e t h e e f f e c t o f t h i s . 
There is one other ambiguity that I would 
like to point out for the record. I don't think we 
can resolve this today, but 77-2a-3, subsection number 
four, states that "The court may require the 
Department of Corrections to assist in the 
administration of the plea in abeyance agreement as if 
the defendant were on probation to the court under 
section 77-18-1. " 
I'm going to be brief on this one. I 
haven't looked up that section, but at least as far as 
this statute is concerned it appears to be ambiguous. 
If the defendant were on probation to the court, we 
normally refer to that as informal probation, not 
supervised by AP&P. That, to me, demonstrates a lack 
OOOiHJ 
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1 of understanding on the legislature's part as to how 
2 probation is administered and how these things are 
3 carried out. 
4 I state that for the record because I 
5 don't know what will happen, but our position is, Your 
6 Honor, that under a plea in abeyance agreement, as 
7 governed by the statute, we cannot impose jail time, 
8 I recognize that the court can, obviously, under the 
9 statute impose conditions and can impose an 
10 administrative fee up to the amount of the fine, and 
11 other conditions such as alcohol programs and whatnot. 
12 My argument to the court, obviously, comes 
13 from the position of a defense attorney. There is 
14 nothing in the statute that specifically says you can 
15 do all of these things but not impose jail time. What 
16 I'm arguing to the court is that if we do all of 
17 theses things and impose jail time, we're really 
18 rendering the statute meaningless and the legislature 
19 has simply wasted trees in printing up all of these 
20 things that the court can do if the court can simply 
21 do anything the court would do anyway. 
22 I don't know if that sheds any light for 
23 the court, but we think it is an ambiguous statute* 
24 We are asking the court to interpret it in favor of 
25 the defendant. We're asking the court to interpret it 
0000 f, 
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in such a way that jail time is not allowed. 
I heard the court impose sentencing on 
others, and particularly Mr. Gochis, who was sentenced 
just previous to this, although I would point out that 
there is a difference in the two cases. In the Gochis 
case there would be a resulting class A conviction. 
In this case there will be no conviction if he 
complies with the conditions. 
THE COURT: Isn't that by itself reason for him 
to do itf even if he served what would otherwise be 
the same equivalent sentence? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: To do the jail time? 
THE COURT: No. To enter into a plea in abeyance 
agreement. When it's all over he can come away with 
no record. There is still an obvious incentive or 
benefit. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: That's correct. My argument is 
that the legislature intended that the defendant come 
away with two benefits. One is no sentence be imposed 
and the second that there be no conviction. I get 
that from the first paragraph under that statute that 
I've cited. 
I think I've made my argument. I'll 
submit it. 
THE COURT: Does the defendant desire to address 
Paere 9 
the court? 
MR, HUNSAKER: I appreciate Mr. Bouwhuis bringing 
that to light to the court, because when I read the 
provisions of the plea in abeyance, as he said, it 
comes in pretty close to the top of the first 
paragraph or two. I like that idea, that if I didn't 
mess up on my probation I wouldn't be sentenced as 
guilty unless I messed up on my probation, is what I 
interpreted it myself. 
THE COURT: Anything from the State? 
MR. BUNDERSON: Your Honor, we would concur with 
the recommendation. As far as the plea in abeyance, 
it's always been my feeling and position, Your Honor, 
that the key to that is the fact that the defendant in 
fact can go through the system, carry out what would 
be a probation and come away with no record. To me 
that is the benefit intended to be conferred by the 
legislature. I see no reason why this court cannot 
impose any restrictions it wants to impose as a 
condition of probation. 
THE COURT: Based upon the recommendation 
received and the plea in abeyance agreement, the court 
will now impose the following conditions as additional 
conditions for the plea in abeyance. 
Number one, I'll require that the 
O G ' ; : ; . -
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defendant serve up to one year in the Box Elder County 
jail. I note that he has already served 82 days. I 
do not require any specific additional time to be 
served. As soon as he can be matriculated into an 
inpatient treatment program, I'll allow him to enter 
that program. He must successfully complete the 
program. If he flunks out of it and comes back before 
the court, his plea in abeyance agreement will then go 
into effect in that he'll have a judgment on the plea. 
So you have to complete the counseling program. 
Once he completes that successfully, an 
alcohol counseling program, I will allow him to be 
released and suspend the remaining balance of the jail 
time . 
I'll require that he pay a fine and 
surcharge in the amount of $925. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Excuse me. Would that be more 
appropriately termed an administrative fee? Let me — 
well, that's fine. 
THE COURT: I'm not sure where you're going with 
that. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: I'll withdraw that. 
THE COURT: All right. As I indicated to him, he 
must complete the inpatient program successfully and 
any after care that is required for a year following 
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completion of the program. 
Number four, I require that he take 
Antabuse as prescribed by a physician and as monitored 
by AP&P. I note for the record that he has at least 
five previous intoxication charges. It's obvious that 
alcohol is ruining his life besides getting him into 
trouble. I expect that the Antabuse will be taken. 
The only way I would waive that requirement is if we 
have a physician indicate that that's not medically 
feasible for this individual. 
I'll require, number five, that he attend 
AA meetings at least once a week. That he not possess 
or consume any alcohol nor have any in his residence 
nor anywhere that he may be staying, and that he not 
be at any place where alcohol is the main item on the 
menu . 
He must submit to random testing of his 
bodily fluids and/or breath and random search and 
seizure of his personal property by any law 
enforcement officer to determine compliance with the 
conditions of probation. 
That he obtain and maintain lawful, 
verifiable employment once he completes all of the 
inpatient and incarceration requirements. And that he 
enter into a standard probation agreement, which means 
OOOiXKi 
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1 he'll have to abide by all laws. You can't be 
2 convicted of any criminal offenses during probation. 
3 Do you understand that? 
4 MR. HUNSAKER: Yes, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: You and Mr. Bouwhuis and your 
6 probation officer need to get busy and start to find 
7 out where you can get into a program. I want you to 
8 understand, Mr. Hunsaker, that I'm trying to design 
9 this to address the problem. If you flunk out, you 
10 could end up at the prison on this very charge. 
11 MR. HUNSAKER: Yes, Your Honor, I realize that. 
12 Can we — am I to pay this fine now or in the event I 
13 flunk out on my probation? 
14 THE COURT: You will owe the fine. If you can 
15 pay it now, I expect you to pay it. If you can't, you 
16 will have to pay it during the period of your 
17 probation 
18 That's all. Good luck to you 









C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER) 
SS 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the sentencing proceed-
ings were taken before me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a 
Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and 
for the State of Utah, residing at Brigham City, Utah 
That said proceedings were reported by me in 
stenotype and thereafter were by me transcribed into 
typewriting; and that a full, true and correct 
transcription is set forth in the pages numbered 2 to 
13, inclusive. 
I further certify that the original transcript 
was filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, 
Box Elder County, Brigham City, Utah* 
I also certify that I am not associated with any 
of the parties to said matter and that I am not 
interested in the event thereof. 
Witness my hand and official seal at Brigham 
City, Utah, this 22nd day of March, 1996. 
Al. IJJUL^ 
R o d n e y M . f / F e l s h a w , C . S . R . , R . P . R . 
My Commission Expires: 
January 4, 2000 
~~ N° t a rv Pub™ ma ^ 
RODNEY M. FELSHAW g 
Rrst District Court * 
43 N Main fi 
Bngham City, Utah 64302 • 
My Commission Expires B 
• ^i9 9*^ January 4,2000 I 
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ADDENDUM D 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, i 
Plaintiff, ! 
vs. : 
VAO BOYD HUNSAKER, ! 
Defendant. : 
l JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
: ON PLEA HELD IN ABEYANCE 
i Case No. 951000140 
Defendant appeared in open court/ with his attorney, Michael 
D. Bouwhuis, on February 26, 1996, with the State being 
represented by Roger F. Baron, and the defendant having 
previously entered into a Plea in Abeyance Agreement which was 
accepted and approved by the Court/ and the parties having 
previously moved for the Court to accept defendants Plea in 
Abeyance, which Motion the Court granted/ and the defendant 
having entered his plea of guilty, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The defendant has entered a plea of guilty to the crime 
or crimes of: 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A FELONY OF THE 3RD DEGREE 
2. The Court has accepted defendant's plea, and has found 
the same to be given voluntarily and knowingly, and the plea 
shall be held in abeyance pursuant to the terms and conditions of 
this Order. 
3. The defendant is hereby placed under the supervision of 
the Adult Probation and Parole Office, Utah Department of 
Corrections, and is ordered to comply with the terms and 
conditions hereof as if the defendant were on Probation. 
4. The defendant shall enter into an agreement with the 
Utah State Department of Adult Probation and Parole, and comply 
strictly with its terms and conditions, including any search and 
seizure waivers contained therein. 
5. The defendant shall report to the Department and to the 
Court whenever required. 
6. The defendant shall violate no law, either Federal, 
State, or Municipal. 
7. The defendant shall pay a fine and surcharge in the 
amount of $925.00. 
8. The defendant shall serve 1 year in the Box Elder County 
Jail with release to an inpatient program as soon as it can be 
arranged. The remainder of the jail sentence shall be suspended 
upon successfully completing the inpatient program. 
9. The defendant is to take antabuse as prescribed by a 
physician and as monitored by Adult Probation and Parole. 
10. The defendant shall attend at least one AA meeting per 




11. The defendant is not to consume nor possess alcohol at 
his residence or any other location and shall not frequent places 
where alcohol is used or sold as the main item on the menu. 
12. The defendant shall submit to random search and seizure 
of his person, residence, vehicle or property without probable 
cause and without a search warrant to determine compliance with 
his plea in abeyance and these conditions. The defendant shall 
submit to random testing of his bodily fluids and/or breath at 
the request of any law enforcement officer. 
13. The defendant is to obtain and maintain lawful 
verifiable employment as approved by his probation officer. 
14. The defendant is to enter into and successfully 
complete an inpatient program and any recommended aftercare for a 
period of one year. 
The Court retains jurisdiction to make such other and 
further Orders as it may deem necessary from time to time, and, 
further, retains jurisdiction to terminate the terms and 
conditions hereof and enter defendant's plea of guilty. The 
Court further retains jurisdiction to sentence the defendant, 
either at such time as this Order is terminated, or at such time 
3 
as the defendant successfully completes the terms and conditions 
hereof• 
DATED this ^ ? day of February, 1996. 
ATTEST: 
SHARON HANCEY, COURT 
BY J/A/U/W6 ?K/l 
^^Deputy Clerk 
RICT JUDGE / 
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